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In the Supreme 9>urt 
of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estates 
of 
WILLIAM ROBERT \X/lLLfAJ\.lS, also 
kno,vn as WILLIAl\1 R. \Xl I l~I..IAl\.fS, 
and SARAH CORLESS WILLIAMS, 
Deceased. 
GLADYS WILLlAi\lS~ also known as 
T 1\N fA KAROL, 
Petitioner and Ap pel/ant. 
Case No. 
9093 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT·. 
STATElvfFNT OF FACTS 
• 
On September 12~ 1958~ William Robert Williams died 
intestate in Salt Lake City~ having been predeceased by his 
\\·.ife. Sarah Corless Williamsj who also died intestate: On 
September 26~ 1958~ Inez Williams Warshaw filed a P~tition 
for Letters of Administration (R. 1-4) in \vhich she claimed 
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to be the only heir of William Robert Williams (R.. 3) ; and 
on October 2 8 she was appointed adminis tra tr ix of the estates 
of both W iltiam Robert and Sarah Corless Williams (R. 8). 
On February 2 7, 19 59, appellant filed a. verified petition alleg-
ing~ inter alia, that as the adopted daughter of decedents she 
\vas entitled to inherit from Wi l tiam Robert Williams on a.n 
eq u a I basis w tih Inez W i 1l iams Warshaw ( R+ 31) . The trial 
court thereafter permitted an amendment to the petition setting 
du t that appellant was en tided to inherit £rom decedent5 by 
virtue of a contract in which they promised to adopt her; 
the rea f te r the parties proceeded as if an amended petition had 
been :fi 1 ed. In her petition appellant also described the content) 
of an holographic will written by William Robert William) 
in September of 19 56, read by appellant) and believed by 
appellant to have been in existence at the time of death of 
Will jam Robert Williams. The Administratrix filed an answer 
denying those all ega. tions in appellant~ s petition ( R. 2 3) . On 
June 5, 1959~ the administratrix~s Motion for Summary JudgT 
ment was granted by the Hon+ Stewart M. Hanson (R. 54). 
The order, in addition to dismissing the petition, purported 
to .find facts as follows: 
~·1. That there V~-ras no valid holographic will existing 
at the time of the death of the Oecedants William R. 
\\· .. illi.am s and Sarah Cor less Williams or e.i ther of them. 
··2. That the Petitioner Gladys Williams, also known 
as Tania Karol, was not and never was the adopted 
daughter of Decedents \XF i1liam R~ Williams and Sarah 
Corless Williams or either of them. 
· [ 3. That Juring arl times mentioned herein there 
was no vaJid and enforceable agreement by Decedents 
William R. \X' illiams and Sa.rah Corless Wili lams, or 
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either of thtm, to adopt Petitioner. Gladys Wililams, 
also known as Tania Karol u. ( R. 5 ~-54) . 
It is well settled that on a Motion for Sum~ary .Judgment 
the moving litigant must show that there is no genuine issue in. 
respect to any material fatt and that he is entitled to .a judg~ 
ment as a matter .of ·law; also that all substantial doubts are to 
be reso 1 ved against him. A ceo rdingl y, the facts to be con-
5id ered in determining w beth e r the trial court's act ion was 
proper are tho~e found in the pleadings, appellant's .ans~~ers 
to interrogatories, and the deposition of Inez \Villiams War-
shaw. The facts the trial court was obligated to consider are 
set out below. 
When appellant was about three weeks old she was taken 
by members of the Relief Society of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, with permission of her natural mother, 
Mrs~ Carroll, to the home of the Williamses to be cared for 
unti 1 such time as Mrs~ Carro 1 i was physitall y and financially 
able to care for the child (R. 44). When appellant was about 
one year oldJ Mrs. Carroll felt capable of caring for the child 
and went to the home of the Williamses for the purpose of 
taking the child back ( R. 44) . On her arrival at the Williams 
home Mrs. Carroll was told that Mrs~ Williams t health had 
been delicate, that she had prev io usl y lost a child and could 
bear no more childr~nt that she had come to Jove appellant 
as her own child, and that if appellant were taken from her~ 
medical complications might result (R. 45). Mrs+ Carroll Vto~as 
asked to consent to the W i lliamses' keeping appellant and 
raising her as their own. She v.,ras to 1 d that if she gave this 
consent the Williamses would love appellantj give her the 
same :schooling and opportunities as their own daughter, and 
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raise her as their own child ( R. 4 S) . Mrs. Carro 11 then con~ 
sented to such an arrangement but at first did not want to sign 
any papers in connection with release of her child (R .. 42). 
When she was about two years old, appellant's natural 
father and mother \vere divorced in .a proceeding in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County) State of Utah. The Court in th~ 
action f ouD d that the Wi lliarnse~ were raising appellant io 
their O\\'fi home v.rith the knowledge and consent of both the 
Carrolls. Money was awarded to Mrs~ Carroll for support of 
appe1lant's natural sister but not for appellant (R. 46). 
At about this time Mrs. Carroll, in the company of her 
teenage son l went to the off ice of Ben Johnson, a Salt Lake 
City attorney, for advice regarding appellant (R~ 42). The 
WiJliamses \\'ere insisting upon adoption of appellant (R. 42)J 
and 1·"1 r. Johnson to I d Mrs. Carroll that this was the t tbest wa?- · 
( R. 42) . Short! y after this meeting with the attorney Mrs. 
Carroll, upon her return home one day~ said she had ~·signed 
[appellant J a\va.y'' and had been required to promise not to 
try to see appellant or tell her, if they ever met, that she w.as 
appellanfs mother (R~ 42) ~ 
During appellant's infancy her natural mother came to 
the Williams home on at least one occasion for the purpose of 
taking back the chi 1 d~ whereupon appellant was hidden by the 
Wi1l1amses (R. 67, p. 9). However, 1-Ir.s. Carroll went away~ 
apparently satisfied~ and there is no indication that any legal 
action was commenced to regain the custody of her child. 
When appellant was eight or nine years old she was told 
by a neighbo(s child that she was not the child of the Wil-
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liamses but ~·as adopted (R~ 45). She was comforted by 
the Williamses and the Warsha·ws and assured that she was 
not adopted but was the child of the Williamses .(R .. 45). 
A certificate of birth (R. 41) vtas entered. of record May 
5, 1918) by the Church of Jesus Chri5t of Latter-day Saints, 
ce rt t f y i ng, among other things~ that a ppe 11 ant ~vas born March 
18, 1910~ at Salt Lake City~ Uta:ti, and that her parents v.tere 
\Xl" illiam R. Willi am s and Sarah Cor 1 css "'V./ i l tiams. 
After appellant was an adult decedent William R. Williams 
purchased a burial plot for her adjacent to that of a son vlho 
had previously died ( R. 4 5) . 
Appellant ¥t'aS held out to the world as the daughter 'of 
the Wi~lia.ms and was regarded as a sister by the ad min is tra t r ix, 
Inez Williams Warshaw (R. 67, p. 3)~ Appellant di~ ··not 
knuw that she was not the natural daughter of the Williamses 
until she Vir as fourteen year so 1 d at which time she \Vas to I d 
by a schoolmate that she had been adopted (R. 46). 
From appellant's infancy until the decedents~ deaths tl:).ere 
were close parent -chi J d rel a ti onshi ps ~ ~n d during that time 
decedents continually held appellant out to the worJd as their 
child~ referring to themselves as he.r ·~loving parents~' (R. 46). 
STATEldENT OF POINTS 
1. A trier of fact could find that a contract to adopt appel-
lant was entered into by decedents William Robert Williams 
or Sarah Cor less Williams or both. 
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2. A contract to adopt, when fully performed by the 
natural parents and their child) will be specifically enforced. 
I 
A TRIER OF FACTS COULD FIND THAT A CON-
TRACT TO ADOPT APPELLANT WAS ENTERED INTO 
BY DECEDENTS WILLIAM ROBERT WILLIAMS OR 
SARAH CORLESS WILLIArviS OR BOTH. 
The development of facts evidencing occurrences of almost 
50 years is a cliff icul t and time-consu1ning task. It may be 
facilitated and shortened by the use of discovery procedures; 
but in this instance the administratrix and the. court have insisted 
t.hat appellant prove her case now-not at a trial. To place 
this burden upon appellant the administratrix has not even 
been required to submit aH idavits as to what she contends 
the true facts to be. It is an odd procedure and an unusual 
burden; even if it were proper appellant has .shown facts 
sufficient to establish a con tract to adopt: the t 4 signing away!! 
of the infant child; the la vryer ~ s advice; the final acquiescence 
of the natural mother. Time rna y make other proof available 
(if weight is the p roble.m) ; but facts already in the record 
tend to prove the contract~ assumption of custody and control 
of appellant by the Williamses; relinquishment of custody 
and con tro 1 by the natural parents; tb e W illiarnses ho !ding 
appellant o~t to the ~:rorld as their child and telling appellant 
throughout childhood that she \1Jr'a5 their natural~ not even 
adopted child; giving appellant their name; causing her to 
be baptized as their own child; a continual pattern of the 
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relationship of parents and child throughout. the Williamses 
lifetime. 
·.' .i'.:'. ·~ ·: f.:•: •.:. 
Many cases have dealt with the validity of and the quantum 
of proof necessary to establish contracts to ad opt; and the 
courts have realistically recognized that such a ~ontract usuaUy 
~ust be proved by evidence other than a parchment scroll-
signed~ sealed and tied with b I ue ribbon. 
In 1Vionahan v~ Monahan ( 195 8) 14 IlL ( 2d) 449) 15 3 
I\TE 2d 1, the Supreme Court of Illinois approved the finding 
of an oral contract to adopt, the finding having been based 
4-poo evidence quite similar to that before the trial court tn 
th~. instant case. 
. . 
· Testimony showed that the natural mother 4 '_gave'!· the 
quasi adopted child to the adoptive. parents when the child ~ras 
six years old. The adoptive parents had the child baptized in 
their o·wn name when the child \Vas nine years old. They 
entered the chi 1 d in schooL as their ·~adopted · child,~' con. 
tin uall y referred to the c b i1 d as their son~ and in turn were 
·by the child referred to as his ~~mom and dad."·. The. child 
conducted him.sel f as a loving and dutiful child. and the adoptive 
parents continued to hold themselves out at his parents~ ·The 
question, in this case, was whether or not- a contract to adopt 
could be established purely by circumstantial . evidence~ The 
Court said: 
~~certainly a contract to adopt as any other fact may 
be proved by circumstantial e~id ence, provided that 
ev i ~ence meets the requisite tests of s uff ici enty ~'' 
. . -
The same viewpoint \Vas adopted in Roberts v~ Rober!J 
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( 1915) ~ 223 Fed. 775, by the United States Court of Appea!.s 
for the Eighth Clrrui t, the Court saying: 
~'The argument by which we are asked to reverse the 
decree is that there \Vas no direct or clear evidence of 
an agreement to adopt at the time Myra J + Roberts ~ras 
received in to the family of Char 1 es Roberts. There is 
good reason why such evidence is wanting+ All of the 
parties to the transaction are dead~ and Myra J. Roberts 
.;vas herself a. babe at the time of the adoption. It seem~ 
to us that in such a case it i.s not necessary that the 
court first have direct proof of the making of the 
con tract, and then proceed forward from the contract 
thus established to the conduct evidencing its exist~ 
encc. We think 1 t is possible to reverse that proce~s, 
and if the statements and conduct of the adopting par-
ents are such as to furnish dear and sa tlsf actory proof 
that an agre-ement of adoption must have existed~ then 
the agreement may be fouod as an inference from that 
evidence.'t 
In In re Garcia's Estale ( 1940) 45 N. M. 8~ 107 P.2d 
866, the plaintiff had been taken into the home of the decedents 
when she was about seven years old4 The decedents had 
promised the plaintiff~ s uncle, who stood in J oc o parenti J j to 
adopt her. From this time on she was continually held out to 
the world both as the decedents~ daughter and as their adopted 
daughter) was baptized with the name of the decedents) entered 
in school by the decedents and given away in marriage by the 
decedents in conformance to a Spanish custom+ The pro.tni.se 
to ad opt was never fulfilled. The question, in this case l was 
one of sufficiency of proof, a New Mexico statute requiring 
cor ro bora tion in suits against heirs. 1 n u pho I ding the decree 
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~· * * ~ the agreement may be established eitner as 
an express or implied contract provided the p.roof 
offered is of the convincing character required in cases 
of this kind * * * . It is not necessary that tb e corrobo-
ration of the plain tiff r s testimony be afforded· by direct 
e:vidence. If this is not available,· the corroboration 
• 1 , ·} , .. _ required. by the statute rna y arise from circu.rnstances .' :r 
In Van Tine v. Van Tine (Nr J.) 15 Atl. 249~ there was 
no written agreement of any kind~ but the qua;i adopted 
child's father gave the child to the adoptive parents when the 
child was only a few moQ. ths oldr The child was raised by the 
quaii adoptive parents, baptized by them and given their 
name, by which name the child was always cal~ed~ both by the 
adoptive parents and neighbors and relatives. The _child was 
raised in the belief that she was the natural chHd of her adoptive 
parents J and did not learn different! y until she was. over the 
age of 18. The adoptive parents left a will, giving to the 
virtually adopted child much of their property, but leaving 
other prope:rty not disposed of. The Court hetd that the parol 
agreement to adopt would be enforced~ and the child entitled 
to inherit the property as if s.he had been adopted according 
to the statutes .. 
Furman v. Craine ( 1912) 18 Ca.L 41~ 121 Pacr .. 1007, 
,\' 
involved an alleged written agreement to adopt)' wherein __ the 
parents forever surrendered to adoptiye parents tpe _control, 
custody and society and relinquished all claims an9- ! igh_ts to 
th~ child, but !?e complete in~trument_ was not foQnd or enter~q 
in .ey.idence~. _Only !•a mutiliated copy,. conta.in~ng ljtt~e of ~he 
substance of the agreement'' was introduced. F~rthe~ testim~ny 
showed that the natural parents tel eased the contra 1 ~ cus to<;ly 
.ll 
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and society ot the four-year-old child and from that time on, 
the quasi adoptive parents took charge of the child and raised 
her as a member of the family~ and that the child, throughout 
her life, until the death of the quasi_ adoptive parerits, con-
ducted herself at all times as a dutifu] child. The Court decreed 
specific p cr f ormanc e of the con tract and held that the chi 1 d 
Vot' as entitled to j nherit the decedents t property as if a natura 1 
child+ 
The record in the instant case contained sufficient evidence 
to support a :finding that there was a contract to adopt. More~ 
overl •t also contained material from which it should have 
been apparent to the trial court that other evidence might be 
obtained by appellant prior to trial time. Accordinglyl the 
judgment should be reversed since~ as shown below~ contracts 
to adopt are s pee ifi call y enforceable. 
II 
A. CONTRACT TO ADOPT, WHEN FULLY PER-
FORMED BY THE NATURAL PARENTS AND THEIR 
CHILD~ WILL BE SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED~ 
The above point is a para phrase of a 1 egal rule accepted 
by the great majority of courts that have been asked to enforce 
contracts to adopt. The view is referred to in 2 C.J .S., Adoption, 
§ 27 ( 6) ~ p. 399) as follows: 
'~ * * * Under the pr inci pl e that equity will consider 
that done which ought to have been done, the a uthori-
ti es very genera 11 y establish the pro position that a 
contract by a person to adopt the child of another as 
his own~ accompanied by a virtual, although not a 
12 
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statutory . adoption, and acted upon by both parties 
during the obligor's life, may be en£ ore ed~ upon the 
death of the obligor, by adjudging the child entitled 
to a natural child!s share in the property of the obligor 
who dies without disposing of his property by will.=-~ 
This cout t has not specifically considered the enforceability 
of contracts to adopt; but enough courts have found them 
en£ o.rceabl e that the numbers--even without the reasons-
might tend to establish the soundness of the view that such 
contracts should be enforced. The following cases are repre-
sen ta_ti ve ~ not exhaustive .. 
A leading ~nd frequently cited c_ase i.s C he hak v. Batt! es 
( 1907) 133 Iowa 107, 110 N.W. 330~ in which a quasi adopted 
child claimed a right in the estate of the deceased quasi adoptive 
parents~ pursuant to a :'ritten agreement sig~ed hy the child's 
natural mother~ and the deceased quaJi adoptive parents J 
which contract recited that the natural mother gave the quasi 
adoptive parents her child for the purpose of ·adoption, and 
stated that .such child '"[shall be named as they shall seem fit, 
and bear the name of Battles". and the quasi adoptive parents 
covenanted ! ~that they and each of them accept the rights, 
duties and retations of a parent to this child, and shall in 
all respect be that of a child born to themselves in the state 
of wedlock, and that the same shall include all of the rights 
of inheritance by law. j ~ A statutory adoption was never at~ 
tern pte d. The Court decreed that the contract should be 
speci.ficall y en farced regardless of the statu tory requirements 
for a completed adoption. In its opinion~ the Court said: 
"Though a contract of adoption could not be. sus-
tained in common law" the courts of equity enforce 
13 
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such con tracts \~· hether oral or in ,v ri ting vl i th respect 
to property rights invo]ved * * * . The obligations 
of such a contract as of others are mutual, and the 
peculiarities of it, such as emphasize the right of him 
who has faith fu 11 y performed his part of it to that 
portion stipulated by the other party. It. is impossible 
to estimate by any pecuniary standard the value to 
the parties r€ceiving a child) nor is tbere any design 
of so measuring the service and soffice bestowed~ The 
nature of the con tract necessarily precludes a] I thought 
of returning the consideration, and after the mother 
has yielded the posses sian of her child with all that 
this means, and it has lived until rna j ori ty as a dutiful 
and loving son or daughter with those who have prom. 
ised to cherish him or her as their own., and that he 
or she sh.all share their estate~ it is beyond the power 
of the adopted parents or the courts to place the mother 
or chi td in the situation in which they were before the 
agreement was entered into. There is no such thing 
in cases like this as placing the parties in status quo f 
and the remedy must be specifically enforcing the con-
tract or tb e denial of rip;h ts which have been fully 
earned, and in good conscience aod justice ought to be 
enforced .. '' 
California courts will enforce contracts to .adopt. See 2 
Cal. Jur~ 2d 424; also~ In re Radovith1 s Estate ( 1956), 48 
Cal. 2d 116, 308 P+ 2d 14~ in which the Court said: 
~~There can be no question but tbat the agreement 
was valid~ and that Judge Oark correctly decided 
George is entitled to distribution of all of the estate 
of the decedent." 
This case was concerned di r cctl y \\-' i th the question of 
whether or not) for inheritance tax purposes, the quasi adopted 
child was entitled to the exemption granted by statute to a 
14 
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natural or adopted child, but the Court expressed no concern 
over the lower court decreeing specific performance of an oral 
agreement to adopt a seventeen·year-old child, where there 
~ad been no statutory adoption but the agreement had been 
fully performed on the part of the child, and the natural 
parents had relied on this agreement+ 
In Fisher vlo Davidson ( 1917) 2 71 ~lo. 195, 195 S. W. 
1024, a husband and wife had assumed possession and control 
of a threer year -old child under an agreement to take .and raise 
her as their own child, the child to assume the name o £ the 
adoptive parents. They took the child into their home~ changed 
her name and thereafter until death, a considerable period of 
time, treated her as their child, she being commonly known 
in the circle in which they moved as their child. The Court 
held that in equity she would be deemed to be the adopted 
child and entitled to inherit the property of her adoptive 
parents. 
In Ezell v. Mobley ( 192 5) 160 Gar 87~, 129 S.E. 5 32, 
the Court held that a para 1 obligation to adopt a child of 
another ace om panied by a virtual, though not a statutory~ 
adoption, is suHicient to ~arrant the enforcement of such obli. 
gation in equity by decreeing the quasi adopted child to ·be 
en titled to a natural child· s share in quasi adoptive parents) 
estate, in the event of the Ia tter .. s intestacy, and upheld the 
right of a virtually adopted child to . contest the will of her 
£ oster parents~ 
Many other cases) in a substan tl:al number of jurisdictions~ 
recognize and enforce contracts to adopt, both written and 
oraL See_ 2 A.L.R~ 1190; 69 A~L.R. 35; 33 A.L.R. 741; In re 
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Biehn's EJtate ( 1933) 41 Ariz+ 403~ 18 P.2d 1112; Wooley v. 
Shell Petroleum Corporation ( 1935) 39 N.M. 256~ 45 P.2d 
927; Bedal v. Johnson ( 1923) 37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 641; 
In re Stoibeis EJtate ( 1937) 101 Colo .. 192~ 72 P.2d 276; Wright 
v. Wright ( 1894) 99 Mrch. 170, 58 N+W. 54; Mfflvttin t. 
ilfcEivain ( 1902) 171 Mo. 244, 71 S~W~ 142~ Burns k Smith 
( 1898) 21 Mont. 251, 53 Pa.c. 742. 
It takes an Alice-in~ Wonder land type of imagination to 
conceive any reasons of public policy that would prevent a child 
from sharing in his de facto adoptive parents 1' estate merely 
because the parents had failed to do what they promised to do. 
The right of a child to inherit has nothing to do with the for-
malities necessary, under our adoption statutes, to foreclose 
natural parents from reclaiming their children; and Ta}'lor t'. 
W addou ps ( 19 52) 121 Utah 279, 241 P .2d 15 7, involving a 
dispute between natural and adoptive parents over custody of 
a child, does not touch our problem. 
We are concerned with property rights here. Where does 
the parents~ property go~ and ho'v? Should the promises and 
ex pecta ti ons of t be decedents be given effect~ or should a 
non-participant in the transaction receive a windfall because 
of a failure to act as promised? This court has not hesitated 
to s peci fica ll y enforce con tracts under which property is to 
be disposed of in a certain way upon death. See Randall r. 
T racy-C'ollins T fUJI Company ( 1956) 6 Utah 2d 18] 305 
P.2d 480; Van Cott v. Brinton ( 1983) 8 Utah 480~ 33 Pac. 
218; and f/ an Natta v. Heywood ( 1920) 57 Utah 376, 195 
Pac. 192. 
If contracts to leave property may be enforced specifi.cally, 
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why not contracts to adopt, at least insofar as they affect dis po-
sition of property. As the Court sa.id in Chehak t:. Battles, cited 
supra, p~ 33 3: 
·~If a contract with an adult to convey or will property 
in consideration of services rendered may be enforced 
by such an adult, and one for "lW' hose benefit a contract 
has been made may enforce it [in this state]~ upon 
\vhat tenable theory shall the Court~ upon demand of 
a child who has met all the obligations imposed, deny 
s pecifi.c performance of the solemn agreement of a 
deceased person who, upon the ample consideration of 
the sur render of such chi 1 d by its natural parent~ w.i th 
the privilege of naming it and the benefits derived 
from its care) custody, and services, has promised that 
such child shall share in or take all of his estate, and 
has died without providing for the execution of his 
promise ? To so decree is not to a ward the right to 
inherit, which depends on status, but to enforce a 
contract for the disposition of property, and there is 
no reason for denying an infant the right to such relief 
when it is £reel y accorded to an adult.~~ 
CONCLUSION 
It is not c 1 ear from the record just v-,r hat the basis of the 
trial court's ruljng was~ We would have felt safe in presuming 
that the basis was a belief that contracts to adopt are nqt 
enforceable against the e.s tate of the deceased prom issor ~ but 
the court~ s inclusion .in its order of what appear to be fin dings 
of fact has raised some question in our minds as to whether 
the court weighed the various evidence 01 meant to. indicate 
in its order that the matters before it made it appear to a 
certainty that there could be no satisfactory proof of a contract 
17 
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to adopt. We submit that the evidence outlined would be 
.sufficient to make out a con tract to adopt; and if it is not~ the 
petitionees answer to interrogatories makes it appear that 
there is or may be additional evidence of a written contract 
to adopt-evidence \v hich the petitioner was not given an 
opportunity to obtain. Accordinglyl it would appear that the 
court has not interpreted the rules, particular 1 y the summary 
judgment rule~ in such a manner as to obtain substantial justice. 
0 n the other hand~ if the cou rf s ruling \\-'as based upon 
a view that contracts to adopt are not enforceable, we submit 
that the view is er ron eo us and opposed to a s.u bstantial weight 
of judicial authority. Admittedly the state .. s adoption statutes 
require that certain £ ormali ties be followed in order to accom-
Plish a vaLid adoption. But the adoption statutes are primarily 
for the protection of children and natural parents. It is appror 
priate that the 1 egislature would not wish to have the rights 
o £ the natur a.l parents, and the right o £ the child to live with 
its natural parents~ taken away except under closedly guarded 
procedures. That the interest of the child is of paramount im~ 
portance is pointed out in Taylor t·. W addoups supra. But here, 
we are not concerned with the rights betw'een the natural 
parents~ the adoptive parents and the child. The adoption 
was an ac:com plished fact~ whether the formalities were fol-
lowed or not. It is a fact that the child lived out her childhood 
with the adoptive parents, that the natural parents relinquished 
control, that there was no dispute as to the :right to custody. 
The parties concerned recognized the adoption+ The oniy 
person who does not recognize the adoption is one who stands 
to benefit~ monetarily, by taking refuge in technicalities of an 
adoption statute and in the passage of time+ Throughout their 
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lifetimes Mr. and Mrs. Williams received the benefits of the 
de fa,to adoption. Mrs. Williams had the affection that she 
needed and filled the void left by the loss of her own child and 
her jnability to bear another~ Throughout childhood and adult-
hood the appellant continued in her relationship a.s a child 
.and was considered to be a child by the only other principals 
involved. 
Whether the petitioner can prove a completed de jure 
adoption or not~ and it is not certain at this point that she 
cannot, the contract to adopt ought to be enforced a.nd the 
expectations of the decedents fulfilled. As this court said in 
Van Natta v. Heywood et ai. ( 1920) 57 Utah, 376:~ 195 Pac. 
192t supra: 
u * * * If the courts "V~t·ere powerless~ as a matter 
of equity~ to carry out the in tent and purposes of the 
deceased to fulfill his expressed promise in agreement 
with the plaintiff, so repeatedly admitted and always 
acted upon by the plaintiff> then indeed would they 
be helpless to award that which the inherent justice 
of a case demands.~' 
The judgment. of the District Court should be reversed 
and the case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dudley M. Amoss 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Alto rn eys for Petitioner and A p pel/ant 
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